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ABSTRACT
RATIONALITY AND ILLUSIONS OF HEALTH
MAY 2000
PAUL NORRIS, B.F.A., RHODE ISLAND SCHOOL OF DESIGN
B. ARCH., RHODE ISLAND SCHOOL OF DESIGN
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Seymour Epstein
People use two different modes of thinking: rational or analytic, and experiential or
heuristic. Individuals who describe themselves as highly rational report low levels of
psychological dysfunction. But some highly rational individuals may be classifiable as
repressors, denying a high level of psychological distress because they regard it as
socially undesirable. It was hypothesized that highly rational individuals who are low in
experientiality will typically demonstrate heightened reactivity to stress in the absence
of self-reported psychological distress, while highly rational individuals who are also
high in experientiality will not. 42 male and 34 female college students replied to
standard self-report inventories and underwent mildly psychologically stressful tasks.
Heart rate and blood pressure were measured before and after the stressor. Analysis of
physiological measures and mood-adjective checklists revealed significant differences
between the high rational/high experiential group and the overall mean for all subjects,
though in the direction opposite to that hypothesized. Although the hypothesis had not
been supported, there was evidence that high levels of rationality may be associated
with illusory mental health.
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CHAPTI'R 1
INTRODUCTION
People commonly distinguish between logical analysis and intuitive leaps,
between coldly rational thought and a more fallible, emotionally-tinged or rule-of-
thumb decision-making. Especially in the realm of science, one extreme is often valued
as reliable and discriminating, while the other is seen as a source of error.
In social psychology, dual-process models differentiate between intentional,
deliberative information processing, and a more automatic, habitual mode (Chaiken,
1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). In these models, there is a
rough equivalence between intentionality, rationality, and accuracy of processing. On
the other hand, the automatic mode is used when the task lacks sufficient importance, or
the mdividual lacks the cognitive resources, to employ the more intentional mode. Thus
it is regarded by these theories as less accurate and therefore less dependable than the
intentional: an inferior substitute for true rationality.
Epstein's cognitive-experiential self-theory (CES f; Epstein, 1973, 1990;
Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1994) differentiates between rational and
experiential processing. The former is linear, intentional, and analytic, the latter
emotionally-influenced, holistic, and intuitive. However, unlike other dual-process
models, CEST specifically describes the experiential system as adaptive in its own
right, not less than the rational system. Learning from and utilizing one's experience,
independently of conscious awareness, was the decision-making system used over the
greater part of humanity's evolutionary history. Even today, it is perfectly adequate for
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common processmg tasks. This view is shared by theorists of the cognitive unconscious,
who see the bulk of information processing occurring automatically, and more
efficiently than by means of deliberative processing (Greenwald, 1992; Kihlstrom,
1987; Reber, 1989).
Experientiality can be more effective than rationality. Most interpersonal
interactions and projections of future outcomes involve a host of mutually
interdependent variables: it is prohibitively cognitively-intensive to attempt to specify
all of these variable with a high degree of accuracy (see Hill, 1988). In these situations,
a Reeling' can be more useful than a fact.
Investigation of the relative utilization of the two systems tends to focus on the
degree to which individuals are motivated to use the more effortful, rational system
(e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986). The assumption is apparently made
that, as the experiential is the default system, it is equally available to all. It is possible
that this system is capable of refinement, improvement, or development. Such human
attributes as common sense and wisdom do not depend solely on conscious analytical
reasoning; and they are recognized as present to a greater or lesser degree, changing
over time.
Interaction of the Two Systems
What is the relationship between the experiential and the rational systems?
Previous research (Norris & Epstein, 1996) suggests that the two systems arc
independent of each other. Using the Rational/Experiential Inventory (Epstein, Norris,
& Pacini, 1995), a self-report measure of ability and valuation for the two modes.
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subjects' rationality and experientiality scores were found to be effectively independent.
Thus, individuals can be more or less rational and more or less experiential: that is, they
can be high in one and not the other, high in both, or low in both.
The hypothesis of the above research was that individuals who are capable of
high levels of both types of processing will be more psychologically healthy than those
who are limited to a single mode. The ability to integrate the two systems should
expand the ability to resolve conflicts and difficulties (see Labouvie-Vief, 1990). Thus,
individuals able to respond flexibly to life's demands should be characterized by a
relatively balanced ability to use both systems, while those limited to one system should
be more subject to psychological distress.
This hypothesis was not completely supported in the previous research (Norris
& Epstein, 1996). Using a 2 (rationality) X 2 (experientiality) analysis of variance
design to analyze self-report measures of psychological adjustment, two groups were
clearly differentiated from all others. The first, the group composed of individuals low
in rationality and high in experientiality, had significantly higher levels of psychological
dysfunction; the second, the group high in rafionality but low in experientiality, showed
a significant absence of psychological distress. Investigation of main effects showed
that rationality was overall a positive attribute, strongly associated with lower levels of
distress. Rationality is evidently a characteristic of mental health, and the inability to be
rational, coupled with a strong experiential bent, is a predictor of distress.
However, although rationality was shown to be an adaptive attribute,
experientiality was not necessarily maladaptive. Individuals high in both rationality and
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experientiality were not significantly more distressed than those high in rationality and
low in experientiality; on several measures of positive adjustment, they had scores
indicative of significantly higher levels of ftinctioning than the mean of the other three
groups. Thus, although rationality is apparently sufficient to guarantee freedom from
dysfimction, experientiality has a moderating effect: in conjunction with rationality, it is
conducive to positive ftinctioning.
Why is a high level of experientiality associated with lower levels of
psychological distress for those high in rationality, but with higher levels for those low
in rationality? One possibility is that both systems are necessary, but the absence of a
strong experiential apfitude has consequences that can be ignored or suppressed by the
individual. Thus, individuals low in experientiality and high in rafionality may not be
immune to psychological distress, but are either unaware of their level of distress or
unwilling to acknowledge it. If this group does show higher levels of denial, and if
individuals high in both rationality and experienfiality do not show high levels of denial,
the difference could be attributed to experientiality. Like rationality, then,
experientiality would provide benefits to the individual, and its absence would be
reflected in higher levels of dysfimction. Is there evidence that individuals high in
rationality and low in experientiality are also characterized by denial of psychological
distress?
Illusory Mental Health
A distinction can be made, for individuals reporting low levels of anxiety,
between those who also report low levels of defensiveness or social desirability, and
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those who report high levels of defensiveness (Weinberger, Schwartz, & Davidson,
1979). The former are regarded as truly low in anxiety, while the latter are regarded
repressors, "traditionally defined as persons manifesting heightened recognition
thresholds for anxiety-provoking stimuli, [who] consistently avoid disturbing cognitions
across a variety of perceptual, projective, and learning tasks" (p. 369). Although
repressors report low levels of anxiety, they show evidence of high levels of stress, as
assessed by physiological and behavioral measures of reactivity to psychologically
stressful tasks.
More recently, Shedler, Mayman, and Manis (1993) have illustrated the inability
of standard self-report measures to distinguish those truly low in neuroticism from those
characterized by what they call illusorv mental health . Their distinction is similar to that
of Weinberger et al. (1979): of those reporting low levels of neuroticism, "one subgroup
is psychologically healthy. A second subgroup is made up of people who are
psychologically distressed, who maintain an illusion of mental health through defensive
denial of psychological distress" (p. 1117; emphasis in original). This latter group was
found to show higher levels of reactivity to stress, using both physiological and
behavioral measures. In contrast to the use by Weinberger et al. of self-report measures
as independent variables, however, the two groups were differentiated by discrepancy
versus agreement between self-report measures of psychological distress and objective
evaluations of the individual. This enabled researchers to avoid the potential confound
of relying on a self-report measure of defensiveness, which may fail to measure
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defensiveness and instead measure oversocialization and inhibition (Shedler et al., 1993;
Weinberger, 1990).
It is important to note that in both studies, repressors or defensive deniers had
higher levels of reactivity to psychological stress than individuals who reported high
levels of neuroticism and anxiety. At the same time, in Weinberger et al. (1979), the
repressors reported high levels of defensiveness, but lower levels of trait anxiety than
the low-anxious group. Thus, in a previous study (Norris & Epstein, 1994), the status of
the low rationality/high experientiality group as the most psychologically disturbed may
be due neither to the negative consequences of high experientiality, nor to the absence
of rationality's beneficial effects, but to that group's willingness to acknowledge
psychological distress; distress which may actually be shared, or exceeded, by
repressors.
In order to understand the interaction of rationality and experientiality, and its
consequences for psychological functioning, it is necessary to determine whether any of
those groups under consideration may be largely composed of repressors, and differ
from other groups in this respect.
Overview of Present Study
The independent variables in the present study were the previously used self-
report measures of rationality and experientiality (Norris & Epstein, 1994). In addition,
to control for the effect of social desirability and in order to replicate Weinberger et al.'s
(1979) independent variable of repression, a self-report measure of defensive social
desirability was used in selecting subjects.
Subjects responded to self-report measures of anxiety, self-deception, and an
inventory of medical conditions and symptoms. Subjects were then subjected to mild
psychological stress, induced using Thematic Apperception Test cards and a phrase
response task. Latencies to the phrase response task, measures of blood pressure and
heart rate, as well as subjects' responses to a mood-adjective checklist, were taken over
the course of the experiment. The crux of the study was the assessment of illusory
mental health, the discrepancy between self-reported adjustment and physiological
measures of stress. This study is thus an adaptation of Weinberger et al. (1979) and
Shedlcr et al. ( 1 993). Note, however, that in both of these studies, illusory mental health
or defensive denial was used as an independent, rather than dependent, variable.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODS
Subjects
Subjects were 76 University of Massachusetts students, 42 men and 34 women,
who were compensated for participation with credits towards course requirements.
Subjects were selected from a pool of respondents to a pre-screening questionnaire,
administered as a course requirement for introductory psychology, statistics and
methods courses.
Subjects were randomly selected from the cells of a two-by-two matrix,
constructed from the upper and lower quartiles of rationality and experientiality, using
separate means for men and women, as their distributions differ on both measures (see
Materials section for descriptions). In addition, each cell was subdivided by a median
split on social desirability (using the values for men and women for the entire sample of
respondents), in order to ensure approximately equal representation of high and low
values of this variable.
Materials
Subjects were selected using the Rational Versus Experiential Inventory
(Epstein, Norris, & Pacini, 1995), a 20-item self-report instrument using a Likert-type
scale of agreement or disagreement. Sample items for rationality are "I have a logical
mind" (rational ability) and "I enjoy intellectual challenges" (rational favorability); for
experientiality, "I trust my initial feelings about people" (experiential ability) and "I
tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions" (experiential favorability). Defensive
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social desirability was measured using the Defensiveness subscale of Epstein's Ego
Strength Scale (adapted in part from the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale).
Physiological measurements of systolic blood pressure, diastolic blood pressure,
and pulse rate were made by finger plethysmograph at specified intervals throughout the
study. At each of these times, three different readings were taken by finger
plethysmograph, to compensate for inaccuracies in the admittedly low-tech equipment.
The median reading was used for all analyses; analyses using the initial readings were
not significantly different.
Following each physiological measurement, subjects responded to a seven-item
mood-adjective checklist. Seven emotional states were characterized by a set of three
adjectives each, and subjects indicated the extent to which their emotional state could be
described by each set of adjectives. The seven emotional states were alert, tense, tired,
irritated, calm, anxious, and jittery.
The short form of the Taylor Manifest Anxiety scale (Bendig, 1956) served as a
self-report measure of psychological distress. In addition, subjects' responses to the
Beck Depression Inventory, administered on the pre-screening questionnaire, were
available as a supplementary dependent variable. Subjects also responded to a 35-item
inventory concerning medical symptoms and problems, and a 1 9-item abridged version
of the Self-Deception Scale (Sackeim & Gur, 1979).
Procedure
Prospective subjects were selected fi^om the subject pool based on their scores on
the REI and defensive social desirability scale. They were contacted by telephone and
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invited to participate in the study. All subjects were run individually, by one of three
female research assistants, in a laboratory containing only a table, two chairs, and the
experimental materials.
Self-report Measure
At the beginning of the session, subjects were told that they would be answering
questionnaires, writing some stories, and responding to spoken phrases, and that their
blood pressure would be taken at various points. After signing a consent form and
filling out a credit opscan sheet, they were asked to wash their hands. They were then
told, "Now, before we continue, I want you to relax a bit. Just sit back comfortably in
your chair." They were told to close their eyes and breathe quietly for a couple of
minutes. At the end of two minutes, subjects' heart rate and blood pressure were
recorded three times, using the finger plethysmograph. Following this, subjects
responded to the seven-item mood-adjective checklist. They were then given the short
form of the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, the medical inventory, and the Self-
Deception Scale. After responding to the measures, heart rate and blood pressure
readings were taken again, and subjects responded to the mood-adjective scale.
Psvchologicallv Stressfijl Tasks
Following the self-report measures, TAT and phrase association tasks were
administered. The TAT response task, which was expected to be less psychologically
stressftil, was given first. It was introduced as follows:
I am going to show you a series of pictures, and I want you to make up a story
about each one. Tell me what is happening in the picture, what led up to it, and
what the outcome will be. Also describe what the characters are thinking and
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fedmg. [This and the following instruction were adapted from Shedler et al.,
Subjects were then shown three TAT cards, one at a time. Each one was turned
over and held upright for three minutes, during which time subjects wrote their stories
in a booklet provided for the purpose. The first card (card 3BM) shows a woman,
huddled on the end of a couch, with what might be a gun lying on the floor next to her.
The second (card 1 8GF) shows an older woman holding a younger woman, with her
back to the viewer; the older woman's expression is strange, and her grip on the younger
woman is stiff. The third (card 13MF) shows a man standing next to a bed, in which lies
a naked woman, apparently asleep but possibly dead; the man is fully clothed, and
stands with his arm over his eyes, in a dramatic pose. After the card was shown for three
minutes, the next card was turned over and the research assistant said, "Okay, stop
writing and turn to the next page."
Following the TAT response task, the research assistant introduced the phrase
association task as follows:
For this next part I'm going to play a tape of some sentences to you. After each
sentence, I want you to say the first thing that comes to mind, as quickly as
possible. Give me a complete sentence or idea, not just a word. Anything you
say as a response is fine, there are no right or wrong answers. Just say the first
phrase that comes to mind. Please speak loudly and clearly, and try to relax
between sentences.
The research assistant then started a tape recorder on which thirteen phrases
were recorded. Each phrase was followed by a thirty-second period of silence, during
which the subject was to respond to the phrase. The first three phrases were neutral in
content, e.g., "The dairy farm bought cows." The next four phrases were based on
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themes of dependency, balanced between male and female givers and receivers: "His
mother had to support him" and "She pleaded with her lather" arc examples. I hc next
three phrases were aggressive in content, e.g., "The stepmother brutally beat the child."
The last three phrases were sexual in content, e.g., "His girlfriend is very promiscuous."
Subjects' responses were recorded on a second tape recorder. Following the subject's
last response, the research assistant took their blood pressure and heart rate, and subjects
responded to the mood-adjective checklist.
Relaxation 1
The research assistant then debriefed the subject, as follows:
One of the things this experiment is about is learning how people react to
anxiety. The cards you were shown, and the sentences you responded to, were
designed to be a little unsettling, in order to get spontaneous responses. So if you
feel at all embarrassed about anything you said or wrote, remember that's
normal. In fact, being able to express embarrassing thoughts may actually mean
you're well-adjusted. That's one of the things this study is investigating.
Subjects were then told to sit back and relax with their eyes closed, for two
minutes. Following this, their blood pressure and heart rate were again taken, and they
responded to the mood-adjective checklist.
Relaxation 2
Finally, subjects were told that experimenters wanted to get a measurement of
blood pressure under conditions of maximum relaxation. They were told to sit back and
close their eyes, and the research assistant started a tape recorder with a guided imagery
relaxation instructions. The tape told them to picture themselves on a beach, to smell the
air and hear the waves, and to relax the muscles in specific parts of their neck, face,
shoulders and arms. The instructions took approximately one minute; for another two
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minutes, subjects sat with their eyes closed, listening to the tape recording play sounds
of surf on a beach. At the end of three minutes in all, the tape recording told subjects to
stretch slowly, take a deep breath, and open their eyes. The research assistant then took
their blood pressure and heart rate, and they responded to the mood-adjective checklist.
Dependent Variables
Illusory mental health, the discrepancy between actual and self-reported
psychological distress, was operationalized as the physiological measure of stress or
reactivity minus the corresponding self-report of anxiety. This defines physiological
arousal as evidence of anxiety, and assumes that self-report of anxiety or tension
assesses an equivalent phenomenon.
Subjects responded to two different measures of anxiety. One was the Taylor
Manifest Anxiety Scale, a measure of trait anxiety, and the other was the mood-
adjective checklist administered following each measurement of blood pressure and
heart rate. Because both repeated-measures and between-subjects measures of anxiety
were available, discrepancy scores were calculated using each type of variable.
The repeated-measures discrepancy variable was calculated for each of the five
measurement times, using the self-reported mood-adjective ratings. Of the seven
adjective sets included in the mood-adjective checklist, five are descriptive of states of
arousal or reactivity: "tense, stressed, or on edge", "worried, anxious, or nervous",
"irritated, annoyed, or angry", "jittery, shaky, or unsettled"; the fifth triad describes the
opposite state, "calm, relaxed, or at ease". Factor analysis for each of the measurement
dmes grouped these five sets in one factor, distinct from a factor composed of the other
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two sets ("alert, alive, or enthusiastic" and "tired, weary, or unreactive"). Internal-
consistency reliability analyses showed acceptable internal coherence for the composite
anxiety measure (for the five measurement times, all mean inter-item correlations ^ .50,
all item-total correlations > .35, all alphas >
.80). For this measure, the triads that
include the adjectives "anxious" or "tense" loaded most highly, and the triads that
include the adjectives "calm" (reversed) or "angry" loaded least highly. The low
loadings for the reversed "calm" triad were unexpected. Possibly the loadings are
affected by the reversed direction.
To calculate the repeated-measure discrepancy vaiiable, the two measures must
both be adjusted to comparable metrics. For this purpose, range-corrected scores were
calculated for both the physiological and self-report measures. Range-corrected scores
are a form of ipsatization. They represent each measurement as a proportion of the range
of scores for each subject, by expressing it as the difference between the specific score
and the subject's minimum score in the five periods, divided by the subject's overall
range, as follows: (specific score - minimum score)/(maximum score - minimum score).
The repeated-measures discrepancy variables were then computed as the range-
corrected physiological measure (systolic blood pressure, diastolic blood pressure, or
heart rate) minus the range-corrected composite anxiety measure. High scores thus
represent high physiological reactivity relative to self-reported anxiety or tension, an
indicafion of illusory mental health.
The between-subjects discrepancy measures were calculated as the difference
between subjects' self-ratings of general anxiety and their over-all measures of
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physiological reactivity, for each of the three physiological indices. For this purpose, the
five measurements for each type of physiological measurement were averaged. In order
to adjust the physiological and self-report measures to comparable metrics, each was
standardized. The between-subjects discrepancy variables were then computed as the
standardized average physiological measure minus the standardized trait anxiety
measure. Again, high score represented illusory mental health.
Two sets of between-subjects discrepancy measures were calculated, using two
measures of over-all anxiety. The first used the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, a
measure of trait anxiety. The second used the composite anxiety measure. For this
variable, the five composite anxiety scores were averaged. The averaged score was
standardized and subtracted from the standardized average physiological measure. This
variable is effecdvely a reformulation of the repeated-measures discrepancy variable, in
a between-subjects format, using standardized as opposed to range-corrected scores.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
For both the repeated-measures and between-subjects discrepancy variables,
their component physiological and self-report variables were analyzed for group
differences. All between-subjects variables were analyzed using a 2 (rationality, high vs.
low) X 2 (experientiality, high vs. low) X 2 (gender of subject) analysis of variance
design. All repeated-measures variables were analyzed using a 2 (rationality, high vs.
low) X 2 (experientiality, high vs. low) X 2 (gender of subject) X 5 (trials) design,
except as noted. Planned contrasts were also performed, comparing the mean for the
high rationality/low experientiality group to the overall mean for the other three groups,
and the mean for the high rationality/high experientiality group to the overall mean for
the other three groups.
Repeated-measures Discrepancy Measures
Discrepancy scores were calculated for each of the five measurement periods, by
subtracting the range-corrected composite anxiety measure from each of the three range-
corrected physiological measures (systolic blood pressure, diastolic blood pressure, and
heart rate).
Repeated-measures Physiological Measurements
Preliminary analysis of physiological measurements for all subjects indicated
that the manipulations had not worked as anticipated (see Figure 1). The expected
pattern would have begun with fairly low readings of blood pressure and heart rate,
representing baseline measurements. The second readings, after answering
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questionnaires, would have been slightly higher; the third, following the stress tasks,
much higher; the fourth, following debriefing and a short recovery period, would have
been lower (comparable to the second or first). The final reading, following the
relaxation period with guided imagery, would have shown a modest decrease from the
recovery period reading, as it would include a floor effect, subjects who did not relax
beyond the recovery period relaxation. However, repeated-measures analysis of the raw
measurements showed no effect for trials for any of the indices (all Fs < 2.0 on 4, 284
df, all ps > .10). The first and last measurement periods were evidently anomalous. A
stress effect was found for the middle three periods (before the stress task, after the
stress task, and after the recovery period) for all three physiological measures (all Fs >
2.00 on 2, 144 df, all ps <.10). The heart-rate deceleration for the post-stress period may
have reflected subjects' increased attention to the stress tasks.
An additional complication was the low correlation of the three physiological
indices with each other. The average correlation of systolic blood pressure with
diastolic, across the five trials, was quite high (average r = .83, p <.010). Systolic blood
pressure and heart rate, however, were not significantly correlated (average r = .04, ns).
Diastolic blood pressure and heart rate were only moderately correlated (average r = .28,
p<010).
Analysis of range-corrected systolic blood pressure over the five trials showed
no significant main effects or interactions for rationality, experientiality, or gender,
either between or within subjects. Range-corrected heart rate showed a significant
experienfiality by trials interaction, F (4,272) = 3.46, ^ < 010, due to the high heart rates
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for low-experiential subjects at the final, relaxation period, while high-expenential
subjects had their highest rate at the first, baseline measurement period.
Between-subjects effects were found for both systolic blood pressure and heart
rate. Heart rate showed a significant between-subjects rationality by experientiality
interaction, F (1,68) = 4.81, p <.04, with the high rational/high experiential group and
the low rational/low experiential group showing higher average heart rates than the
other two groups. For systolic blood pressure, there was a significant between-subjects
contrast of the high rationality/high experientiality group to the mean for the other three
groups, F (1,71) = 5.89, p <.02, with that group's average blood pressure higher than the
others'.
Most relevant to the results of the discrepancy measure (described below),
range-corrected diastolic blood pressure showed a significant rationality by
experientiality by gender by trials interaction, F (4,268) = 4.97, p <.001 (see Figure 2).
This interaction is significant or nearly significant both for men, F (4,152) = 2.80, p
<.03, and for women, F (4,1 16) = 2.34, p =.059. There were no significant main effects
or contrasts, either for men or women or for both.
Analysis of the pattern of measurements for men, using means comparisons at
each of the five measurement periods, shows significant differences for the first two
periods (the baseline and the pre-stress periods). For the baseline period, there is a
significant difference between the mean for the high rationality/high experientiality
group, with the highest initial blood pressure of any group, and the high rationality/low
experientiality group, with the lowest. For the pre-stress period, there is a significant
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difference between the low rationality/low experientiality and each of the other three
groups. Low rational/low experiential men, unlike men in the other three groups,
showed an increase in blood pressure from the baseline period to the pre-stress period.
Note also that high rational/h.gh experiential men tended to show more extreme changes
in blood pressure than men in the other three groups. Their initial reading was
comparable to their post-stress reading, while they showed greater relaxation responses
in the subsequent readings.
The analysis for women produces only one significant difference between
means, in the recovery period. High rational/low experiential women have significantly
lower blood pressure for this period than either low rational/low experiential or high
rational/high experiential women. The two latter groups show no relaxation response
from the post-stress to the recovery period. The group of high rational/low experiential
women, in contrast, shows a definite relaxation response, with relatively low blood
pressure in the recovery period.
Repeated-measures Composite Anxietv Variable
Analysis of the range-corrected composite anxiety measure produced no
significant effects, interactions, or contrasts. (See Figure 3.) Note, however, that
subjects reported feeling most anxious at the beginning of the experiment. As the
experiment continued, their ratings of anxiety declined, increasing slightly at the post-
stress measurement period, and ending with a low rating.
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Repeated-measures Discrepancy Scores
Most subjects showed a tendency to give high estimates of anxiety, relative to
blood pressure readings, for the first two measurement periods. By the last two
measurement periods, their ratings of anxiety were low relative to their blood pressure.
Analysis of the difference between range-corrected physiological measurements
and the range-corrected composite anxiety measure over the five periods produced no
significant effects, interactions, or contrasts for the measures using systolic blood
pressure or heart rate. The measure using diastolic blood pressure showed a significant
rafionality by experientiality by gender by trials effect, F (4,240) = 3.73, p <.010 (see
Figure 4); no contrasts were significant.
For men, there are no significant main effects, interactions, or contrasts for the
repeated-measures discrepancy using diastolic blood pressure. Means comparisons at
each of the five measurement periods show significant differences only for the pre-
stress period, with the discrepancy score for the low rationality/high experientiality
group higher than that for the low rationality/low experientiality group. The low
rational/low experiential group, unlike the other groups, felt less anxious in the pre-
stress period than their blood pressure would indicate. This discrepancy is evidently a
result of their relatively high blood pressure during this measurement period (see Figure
2). Although their pattern of composite anxiety ratings from the beginning of the
experiment to the pre-stress period followed roughly the same declining pattern as those
for the other groups, their blood pressure actually rose during this interval.
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For women, there is a significant within-subjects rational by experiential by
trials interaction for the discrepancy measure using diastolic blood pressure, F (4,112) =
3.19, p <.02. Means comparisons at each of the five measurement periods show
significant differences only for the recovery period, with the discrepancy score for the
high rationality/low experientiality group significantly lower than that for the low
rationality/low experientiality group. The low rational/low experiential women felt less
anxious in the recovery period than their blood pressure would indicate; their relatively
high blood pressure for that measurement would explain this (see Figure 2). On the
other hand, their low blood pressure in the pre-stress period would explain their high
discrepancy score at this time. High rational/low experiential women felt more anxious
in the recovery period than their blood pressure would indicate. Their anxiety score for
this period is an increase over that for the post-stress period, and their blood pressure
reading a decrease.
Finally, although there were no over-all effects for the discrepancy measures
using systolic blood pressure or heart rate, analysis of these measures for women
produced significant rational by experiential interactions (for the measure using systolic
blood pressure, F = 2.53, p <.05; for the measure using heart rate, F = 2.59, p <.05). The
pattern for the measure using systolic blood pressure is almost identical to that using
diastolic blood pressure, although no means comparisons are significant. The pattern for
the measure using heart rate shows few evident differences between groups, and means
comparisons show only higher discrepancy scores for the group of low rational/low
experiential women for final two periods, the recovery and relaxation periods.
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We can explain the significant repeated-measures discrepancy scores as the
result of changes in blood pressure, rather than in self-ratings of anxiety. As the
adjective check-list was administered in conjunction with the blood pressure readings, it
is noteworthy that the two did not produce similar results. Regarding the hypothesized
comiection between either of the two high-rational groups and illusory mental health,
the only result is negative: for women, the high rational/low experiential group showed
the opposite of illusory mental health in the recovery period, over-reporting anxiety
relative to blood pressure.
Between-subiects Discrepancy Measures
There are two types of between-subjects discrepancy measures, each based on a
single self-report measure of anxiety and a single score for each of the three
physiological indices (systolic blood pressure, diastolic blood pressure, and heart rate).
The physiological measure used for both discrepancy variables is the average of the five
repeated-measures physiological readings, for each of the three indices. One
discrepancy measure is the difference between the standardized averaged physiological
measure and a trait anxiety measure. The other uses the average of the five repeated-
measures composite anxiety scores (described above). These two measures of anxiety
show a moderate correlation (r = .38, p <.010). The resulting two types of discrepancy
measures correlate highly with each other (rs range from .68 to .72, all ps <.010).
For the between-subjects discrepancy measures and their component measures,
the rational by experiential by gender analysis was based on 1 and 68 degrees of
freedom; contrasts were based on 1 and 72 degrees of freedom.
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Averaged Physiolog ica l Measures
Analysis of the average of the five measurements of systolic blood pressure
produced only a significant effect for gender, F = 14.71, p <.001 : the average blood
pressure for men was higher than that that for women. There were no other significant
effects, interactions or contrasts, for the average of systolic blood pressure, diastolic
blood pressure, or heart rate. (See Table 1).
Between-subiects Anxietv Measures
Analysis of the trait anxiety measure produced no significant effects,
interactions or contrasts. Analysis of the average of the five composite anxiety variables
produced a main effect for rationality, F = 6.06, p <.02, with low-rational subjects
giving higher self-ratings of anxiety. There was also a significant experiential by gender
mteraction, F = 4.08, ^ <.05. Separate analysis for men showed no effects, while
separate analysis for women showed a significant main effect for experientiality, F
(1,30) = 10.48, £ <.005, with low-experiential women reporting high levels of anxiety.
Most important for the interpretation of the discrepancy measure (described
below), a significant contrast was found for the composite anxiety measure between the
mean for the high rationality/high experientiality group and the mean of the other three
groups, F = 4.09, p <.05 (see Table 2), with the high rational/high experiential group
reporting a lower level of anxiety than the other three groups. Follow-up analyses
revealed a significant contrast between the low rational/low experiential group and the
other three groups, F = 10.27, p <.003, with the low rational/low experiential group
reporting higher levels of anxiety than the other three groups.
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Between-subiects Discrepancy Measnrpq
Analysis of the discrepancy measures based on averaged systolic blood pressure
or heart rate produced no significant effects or interactions. Analysis of the measure
based on diastolic blood pressure showed a significant rational by experiential
interaction, F = 5.73, p <.02 (see Table 1 and Figure 5). All three measures showed a
significant contrast effect for the comparison of the high rationality/high experientiality
group to the mean of the other three groups (for the measure based on systolic blood
pressure, F = 4.05, u <.05; for that based on diastolic, F = 5.35, p <.03; for that based on
heart rate, F = 4.13, p <.05; see Table 1). Follow-up analyses showed no significant
contrasts for any of the other three groups. Thus, the high rationality/high experientiality
group had mean discrepancy scores significantly higher than other groups'. More than
other groups, these subjects were likely to give low ratings of their general state of
anxiety relative to their average blood pressure during the experiment.
Analyses using the discrepancy variable based on the average of the five
composite anxiety ratings produced almost the same pattern of significant results (see
Table 2). The only change was the absence of a rationality by experientiality interaction
for the discrepancy measure based on diastolic blood pressure. The planned contrasts
were still significant, in the same direction. Note, however, that the pattern of means for
low-rational groups is different. In part, this reflects the tendency of the low
rational/low experiential subjects to report significantly higher tension and anxiety than
do other groups when responding to the mood-adjective checklist, as noted above under
"Between-subjects anxiety measures".
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Thus, for all six of the between-subjects discrepancy measures, Ihc high
rational/high experiential group had significantly higher discrepancy scores than the
other three groups. This difference in discrepancy scores was due m large part to the
lower self-ratings of anxiety given by this group.
Analysis for Men and Womnn
As the repeated-measures discrepancy variable produced higher-order
interactions which included subjects' gender, the between-subjects discrepancy
measures were also analyzed separately for men and women, for men, both the rational
by experiential analysis and analysis of contrasts were based on 1 and 38 degrees of
freedom; for women, both analyses were based on 1 and 30 degrees of freedom.
Analyses of the discrepancy measures for men revealed no significant effects,
mteractions, or contrasts. I lowever, for the two discrepancy measures based on diastolic
blood pressure, the contrast between the high rational/high experiential group and the
mean of the other three groups approached significance (for the measure using trait
anxiety, F = 3.98, p = .053; for the measure using the averaged composite anxiety
measure, F = 3.88, p = .056; see Table 3). 1 he discrepancy scores based on systolic
blood pressure showed trends in the same direction (both Fs >3.00, both ps <.08). As
with the corresponding contrast effccts for both men and women, the mean discrepancy
score for the high rational/high experiential group was higher than that for the other
three groups, representing a tendency to give low estimates of anxiety relative to blood
pressure during the experiment.
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Investigating the components of the discrepancy measures for men, analysis of
average systolic and diastolic blood pressure showed no significant effects or
interactions. However, significant contrasts were found between the high rational/high
experiential group and the mean of the other three groups (both Fs > 4.00, both ps <.05;
see Table 3), with that group recording the highest average range-corrected blood
pressure. No significant effects, interactions, or contrasts were found for men for the
trait anxiety measure. The higher scores for this group on the discrepancy measure
based on trait anxiety were thus not a result of lower anxiety, but of their higher blood
pressure during the experiment. Analysis of the averaged composite anxiety measure for
men produced a significant effect for rationality, F - 4.60, u < 04, with high-rational
men giving a lower average rating of anxiety than low-rational men. This would
contribute to the higher scores for high rational/high experiential men on the
discrepancy measure using averaged composite anxiety.
Thus, high rational/high experiential men tended to have higher discrepancy
scores on the four between-subjects discrepancy measures using systolic or diastolic
blood pressure. These scores were a result of higher blood pressure, combined with
lower ratings by high-rational men on one of the self-report measures of anxiety.
Analyses of the discrepancy measures for women produced a significant rational
by experiential interaction for the discrepancy measure based on diastolic blood
pressure and trait anxiety score, F = 4.28, £ <.05 (see Table 4). No contrasts were
significant. For the interaction, the high rational/high experiential group is one of the
two groups high in discrepancy, although not higher than the group of low rational/low
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score
measure
experiential women. The other high-rational group, the high rational/low experiential
group, IS one of the two groups low in discrepancy. The discrepancy measure using
systolic blood pressure shows a rational by experiential trend, F = 3.37, p <.08, with the
same pattern of means.
All three discrepancy measures using the averaged composite anxiety
showed significant main effects for experientiality (Fs range from 4.61, for the
using diastolic blood pressure, to 7.97, for the measure using heart rate; all ps <.05). For
all three experiential effects, the low experiential group showed a negative discrepancy
score, ranging from -1.04 to
-.67, while the high experiential group showed discrepancy
scores ranging from near zero (-.07 for the measure using systolic blood pressure) to .79
(for the measure using heart rate). Thus, low-experiential women tended to give high
estimates of tension and anxiety on the mood-adjective checklist, relative to their blood
pressure and heart rate. High-experiential women gave low estimates of anxiety relative
to heart rate, but roughly comparable estimates relative to blood pressure. Finally, a
significant contrast was found for women for the discrepancy between heart rate and
averaged composite anxiety score, with the group high in both rationality and
experientiality giving low estimates of their anxiety relative to their heart rate, F = 4.22,
P <.05 (see Table 4). The discrepancy measure based on heart rate and trait anxiety
shows a trend for the same contrast, F = 3.04, p <. 10.
Investigating the components of the discrepancy measures for women, no
significant effects, interactions, or contrasts were found for any of the three averaged
physiological measures, or for the trait anxiety measure. Thus, the significant
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discrepancy effect for the measure based on diastolic blood pressure and trait anxiety
score is not explainable in terms of its component measures. Analysis of the averaged
composite anxiety score revealed no significant effects or interactions, but a significant
contrast was found between the group high in both rationality and experientiality and
the mean of the other three groups, F = 5.97, p <.03 (see Table 4). This group gave
lower ratings of anxiety over the course of the experiment than the other three groups,
which would result in higher discrepancy scores on the measure using composite
anxiety score and heart rate, noted above.
For the averaged composite anxiety measure, a significant effect for
experientiality was also found, F = 10.48, p <.004, with low-experiential women giving
higher average ratings of anxiety than high-experiential women. This would contribute
to the main effects for experientiality for the discrepancy measures using the composite
anxiety scores, noted above, as well as to the contrast for the high rational/high
experiential group.
Thus, women high in both rationality and experientiality tended to have higher
discrepancy scores than other women, for both between-subjects discrepancy measures
based on heart rate. For discrepancy scores based on trait anxiety and blood pressure,
the same group of women tends to have higher discrepancy scores than two other
groups, one of which is the group of high rational/low experiential women.
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Supplementary Analyse.';
Analyses of the discrepancy measures and their components were also
performed, using variables unrelated to the hypotheses of interest but which could
possibly moderate the obtained results.
Social Desirability
Subjects had been pre-selected to represent a 2 (rationality, upper and lower
quartile) X 2 (experientiality, upper and lower quartile) X 2 (gender of subject) X 2
(social desirability, median split) matrix, in order to be able to control for social
desirability. For the between-subjects discrepancy measures and their components,
analyses were done using this design, on 1 and 60 degrees of freedom. For the repeated-
measures analyses, analysis was performed using a 2 (rationality, upper and lower
quartile) X 2 (experientiality, upper and lower quartile) X 2 (gender of subject) X 2
(social desirability, median split) X 5 (trials) analysis of variance design. Degrees of
freedom were as noted.
For the repeated-measures variables, analyses revealed no main effects for social
desirability. Significant interactions including social desirability and rationality were
found for within-subjects range-controlled systolic blood pressure measure (rationality
by gender by social desirability), the repeated-measures discrepancy variable based on
systolic blood pressure (rationality by experientiality by social desirability, and
rationality by gender by social desirability), and the discrepancy measure based on
diastolic blood pressure (rationality by experientiality by social desirability). However,
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separate analyses for subjects high and low in social desirability found no significant
effects or interactions for the relevant variables and combinations of variables.
For the between-subjects discrepancy measures, the averaged composite anxiety
measure and the three discrepancy measures based on that measure all showed
significant main effects for social desirability (for the anxiety measure, F =8.12,
^
<.010; for the three discrepancy measures, all Fs > 4.00, all ps <.04). High social
desirability subjects had negative values for the standardized composite self-rated
anxiety measure, and positive discrepancy scores, representing low estimations of
anxiety relative to physiological measurements. No interactions were found between
social desirability and rationality, for any of the between-subjects discrepancy measures
or their component measures.
Analyses bv Individual Research Assistant
A variable representing the three female research assistants was created, in order
to analyze the data for possible experimenter effects.
For the repeated-measures variables, analyses revealed no main effects for
research assistant. Significant interactions involving rationality and the research
assistant variable were found for the composite anxiety measure (rationality by
experientiality by research assistant, and rationality by experientiality by research
assistant by gender), the discrepancy measure based on diastolic blood pressure
(rationality by experientiality by research assistant), and the discrepancy measure based
on heart rate (rationality by experientiality by research assistant by gender). Separate
analyses for subjects run by the three research assistants revealed only a significant
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within-subjects rational by experiential interaction for one research assistant, for the
composite anxiety measure. Analysis of the measure showed no important differences
from the pattern for all subjects, although for the post-stress period the high
rationality/high experiential ity group rated their anxiety level as significantly higher
than the low rationality/high experientiality group.
For the between-subjects discrepancy measures and their components,
significant rationality by research assistant or rationality by gender by research assistant
interactions were found for all but two of the variables. Separate analyses for each of the
three research assistants revealed corresponding main effects for rationality or rational
by gender interactions for all but two of these, a total of eight effects or interactions for
five variables. All of these effects were for the one research assistant (not the same as in
the above paragraph).
For subjects run by this research assistant, the group of high rational subjects
had higher overall heart rates, F = 1 3.60, p <.005, lower averaged composite anxiety
scores, F = 22.56, p <.001, and higher discrepancy scores for the measures using
composite anxiety scores (all Fs > 10.00, all ps <.005). For the composite anxiety
measure, the discrepancy measure based on diastolic blood pressure and composite
anxiety, and the discrepancy measure based on heart rate and composite anxiety,
significant rational by gender interactions were driven by the group of low
rationality/low experientiality subjects, who had higher self-ratings for anxiety, and
negative discrepancy scores, representing high ratings of anxiety relative to
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LatencxMeasures
physiological measurements (all Fs > 9.00, all jds <.010; all contrasts significant, all Fs
>11.00, allps <.005).
None of these results conflicts with results obtained for the sample as a whole.
They will not be discussed further.
Analysis of Predictor Variables
Regression analysis was performed on the discrepancy measures and their
component measures, to examine the possible relationships between illusory mental
health and the variables available for study. Social desirability, self-deception,
rationality, experientiality, and the rational and experiential derogation scales were
entered as predictor variables.
No significant predictors were found for the averaged physiological measures.
For both between-subjects measures of anxiety, rationality and self-deception were
negative predictors, explaining more than twenty-five percent of the variance. These
two variables were also positive predictors of the two discrepancy measures based on
heart rate, accounting for thirteen percent of the variance on the two measures. Self-
deception by itself was a positive predictor of the discrepancy measures based on blood
pressure, accounting for seven or eight percent of the variance for the four measures.
Social desirability was also a positive predictor of three of the six discrepancy measures,
although separately from rationality and self-deception.
Thus, there is a relationship between self-deception and illusory mental health,
and both are associated with higher rationality scores.
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As a preliminary investigation, subjects' responses from the phrase-response task
were coded for latency. Latencies were analyzed both excluding absence of response
from the analysis, and assigning absences an arbitrary latency equal to the shortest time
between phrases (11 .60 seconds). Silences were also analyzed. As only one coder was
available, inter-coder reliability was not achievable, and results must be regarded as
tentative.
For the more conservative measure, excluding absent responses, a significant
rational by gender interaction was found for responses to phrases with aggressive
content, F (1 ,67) = 4.07, p <.05. High rational men responded to these phrases
significantly more quickly than low rational men. Women showed the opposite pattem,
so that high rational women responded more slowly than low rational women, although
not significantly. For phrases with sexual content, a significant main effect was found
for rationality, F (1,65) = 5.26, p <.03, with subjects high in rationality answering more
slowly. This was accompanied by a nearly significant contrast between high
rational/high experiential subjects and the mean of the other three groups, F (1,69) =
3.89, p = .053, in which this group answered more quickly than any other group. No
significant effects, interactions, or contrasts were found for analysis of the phrases with
dependency-related content, or for all stressful phrases. No major differences were
found with the less conservative latency measure.
Analysis of silences produced only a significant contrast for dependency-related
phrases, between the high rational/low experiential group and the mean of the other
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three groups, F (1,71) = 5.21, p <.03, in which this group failed to respond to
significantly more phrases.
These findings are difficuh to reconcile, and not obviously relevant to the
hypotheses under consideration.
Additional Measures
In addition to the measures relevant to testing the hypothesis of illusory mental
health, several additional measures were administered during the course of the
experiment. These were analyzed using the same 2 (rationality, high vs. low) X 2
(experientiality, high vs. low) X 2 (gender of subject) design as before, based on 1 and
68 degrees of freedom except as noted. This analysis was followed by planned contrasts,
based on 1 and 72 degrees of freedom except as noted, comparing the mean for the high
rationality/low experientiality group to the overall mean for the other three groups, and
the mean for the high rationality/high experientiality group to the overall mean for the
other three groups. Means for variables with significant rational by experiential
interactions or significant contrasts are displayed in Table 5.
Medical Check-list
A check-list was administered, assessing the incidence of common illnesses,
medical conditions, and accidents, as well as the number of visits to doctors and
therapists. With one exception (the measure of total symptoms, described below), none
of the multi-item variables on the checklist (emotional symptoms, psychophysical
symptoms, infectious diseases, self-control issues) produced significant effects,
interactions, or contrasts. Significant results were obtained for three single-item
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measures and one summary measure. Items addressing whether subjects were currently
receiving psychotherapy and the number of visits to therapists during the past three
years could not be analyzed, as only five subjects out of 76 responded to each.
An item asking whether or not subjects were currently receiving medical
treatment produced a main effect for rationality, F = 4.65, p <.035, with high-rational
subjects more likely to be receiving medical treatment. This effect was driven by the
high rationality/low experientiality group, as shown by the contrast of that group to the
mean of the other three groups, F = 1 1.50, ^ =.001 (see Table 5). A question assessing
the number of visits to doctors produced a significant interaction between rationality,
experientiality, and gender, F = 6.83, p <.02 (see Table 6), although no group differed
significantly from other groups in range tests.
Analysis of ratings of overall satisfaction with physical health produced a
significant main effect for experientiality, F = 6.17, p <.02, with high experiential
subjects reporting higher satisfaction. A significant contrast was also found between the
group high in both rationality and experientiality and the mean of the other three groups,
F = 6.56, p <.02, in which that group expressed the greatest satisfaction with their
health. Finally, a significant interaction was found between rationality, experientiality,
and gender, F = 4.65, p <.04 (see Table 6), though it is quite complex. A summary
variable of total physical health also produced a three-way interaction, F = 5.76, p <.02;
again, it is difficult to interpret, and range tests showed no significant differences
between means.
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The Sackeim and Gur Self-Deception Scale was administered during the
experiment, as a potential criterion variable for physiological measures. The measure
can be interpreted as having a continuous response scale, making it a measure of
willingness to acknowledge common but discomforting thoughts; or as a dichotomous
measure, assessing denial. Both interpretations showed a main effect for experientiality,
Fs > 6.00
, 28 <.02, with high experiential subjects showing higher levels of denial than
low experiential subjects. The dichotomous interpretation also showed a contrast effect,
with the group high in both rationality and experientiality showing a higher score for
denial than any other group, F = 4.73, p <.04 (see Table 5).
Measures Pertinent to Rationalitv and Experientiality
Unsurprisingly, significant main effects were found for measures of rational
derogation and experiential derogation, included in the pre-screening questionnaire. For
rational derogation, a main effect was found for rationality, F = 38.33, p <.001, with low
rational subjects showing higher levels of rational derogation than high rationals, by a
two to one ratio. More interestingly, range tests found a difference between means, such
that scores for low rational/low experiential subjects were significantly higher than
those for low rational/high experiential subjects, which in turn were significantly higher
than those for either of the high rational groups (see Table 5). A main effect for
experientiality was found for experiential derogation, F = 34.41
, p <.001 , with scores for
low experiential subjects almost twice as high as those for high experiential subjects.
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Personal Relationships
Several measures on the pre-screening questionnaire dealt with subjects'
personal history. Two attachment style prototype questions, out of four, showed
significant effects for experientiality, as well as significant contrasts. The fearful
attachment style prototype was more likely to be endorsed as typical by low
experientiality subjects, F (1,67) = 8.60, p <.010, with high rationality/high
experientiality subjects less likely than the other three groups to endorse the prototype,
F (1,71) = 4.45, p <.04 (see Table 5). The secure attachment style prototype showed the
opposite pattern: it was more likely to be endorsed by high experientiality subjects, F
(1,67) = 5.12, p <.03, and high rationality/high experientiality subjects were more likely
than subjects in the other three groups to endorse it, F (1,71) = 6.61, p <.02 (see Table
5).
Finally, a measure assessing subjects' degree of worrying showed a significant
main effect for experientiality, F = 8.31, p <.010, with low experientiality subjects more
likely to worry. A main effect was also found for gender, F = 5.64, p <.03, with men
more likely than women to worry. A significant contrast was found between the high
rational/high experiential group and the mean of the other three groups, F = 6.75, p <.02
(see Table 5), with that group less likely than subjects in any of the other three groups to
describe themselves as worrying.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
This study sought to provide an alternative explanation for self-reports of low
levels of psychological distress by individuals who also identify themselves as highly
rational. The hypothesis of the study was that these self-reports were evidence of
illusory mental health, the minimization of displayed anxiety and distress. If highly
rational individuals showed greater physiological reactivity to stress than did other
individuals, self-reports of low psychological distress could be reinterpreted as being
intentionally or unintentionally misleading.
Summary of Results
The study demonstrated patterns of discrepancies between physiological
indicators and self-reported anxiety. These discrepancies were consistently associated
with the group of high rational/high experiential individuals, and not with other groups.
Discrepancy measures were calculated for each of five measurement periods, as
well as for the over-all discrepancy between self-reported anxiety and physiological
reactivity. Analyses of the repeated-measures discrepancy variables were difficult to
interpret, and did not support the study's hypothesis. For these measures, the only
evidence directly bearing on the question of illusory mental health for either of the high
rational groups was a relatively low discrepancy score, the opposite of illusory mental
health, for the group of high rational/low experiential women in the recovery period.
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For the over-all discrepancy scores, the high rational/high experiential group
showed higher levels of illusory mental health than other groups did. This result held for
both men and women.
Thus, some high-rational individuals did under-report anxiety relative to arousal,
compared to individuals in other groups. However, the group in question consisted of
individuals high in both rationality and experientiality. Individuals high in rationality
but low in experientiality showed no evidence of such under-reporting. Because a
secondary hypothesis of the study was that high rational/high experiential individuals
would show less evidence of illusory mental health than other groups, these results are
unexpected. In considering the validity of the hypothesis, and the consequences of the
observed results, limitations of the study should be taken into account.
Validity of Experimental Data
The measures of discrepancy were based on differences between physiological
data and self-report data. There are grounds for skepticism regarding both types of
measures.
Physiological measures of heart rate and blood pressure are not necessarily
accurate measures of the effect of stress. No physiological measure is unambiguous,
measuring only the response to a specific stimulus, even for a single individual.
Different individuals may show different physiological responses to the same stimuli.
As was seen in the present study, different physiological indices do not necessarily
correlate with each other, as the reactions they measure are elicited by different stimuli
and follow different response patterns over time. Thus, heart rate responds more quickly
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to stimuli than does blood pressure, including anticipated as well as actual physical
effort. Heart rate also tends to decelerate when the individual concentrates on some
stimuli. For blood pressure, systolic pressure shows a different pattern than diastolic,
being more sensitive to stimulation and thus less stable than diastolic.
The instrument used to measure physiological reactivity in this study is a
relatively crude machine. The low reliability of such an instrument is less problematic
for heart rate, which is more easily observed than blood pressure. The fact that diastolic
blood pressure gave stronger and more consistent results than did systolic may be a
consequence of that measure's greater stability. The fact that significant and consistent
results were obtained for measures of discrepancy based on blood pressure is
noteworthy, given the low reliability of the instrument used.
The relative absence of significant effects for the self-report data is partly a
consequence of the low variability of the data. Self-reports of tension or anxiety showed
no significant differences between groups on the repeated-measures variable. To the
extent that self-reported anxiety differed from physiological measures, but was intended
to assess the same underlying construct, it can be considered to be inaccurate. Self-
reported anxiety followed a consistent pattern, declining over the course of the
experiment, rising in the post-stress measurement period, and dropping to its lowest
point in the final recovery and relaxation periods. This was a predictable path, and
therefore need not have represented accurate self-awareness or self-report.
Consequently, it may have been in fact an accurate report of subjects' feelings, or their
attempt to present reasonable responses. However, the high initial values, matching high
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initial readings for the physiological measures, seem consistent with some subjective
awareness of actual arousal.
Experimental Manipulations
The purpose of the experimental manipulations was to create a stressful
situation, in which subjects' physiological responses to stress could be examined. It
must be acknowledged that in most cases the actual manipulations failed to achieve
their effect in an unambiguous fashion.
The relatively high readings on physiological indices for the first measurement
period may represent a response to a novel and somewhat threatening situation. For
most subjects this reading was comparable to the post-stress reading. Thus, the stress
manipulation did not necessarily represent an increase in stress over the baseline
situation. Alternatively, the relatively weak physiological response in the post-stress
period could be a result of a ceiling effect: a proportionately greater stress might have
been necessary to elevate the physiological indices above this point. Self-protective
mechanisms may also have come into play. Subjects may have consciously or
unconsciously suppressed their physiological responses to the stress tasks, for example
by focussing on the content of the stimuli. The tentative explanation of heart rate
deceleration in the post-stress period as a consequence of increased attentiveness would
be congruent with this suppression hypothesis.
Additional Measures
Analyses of the additional measures administered in this study is illustrative of
the nature of the two high-rational groups.
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1
ligh rational/low experiential individuals arc characleri/,cd only by being more
likely to be under medical treatment. This Hnding seems inconsistent with self-
deception and with illusory mental health. Dillcrential tendency to seek medical
treatment may indicate health problems, or simply a greater attentiveness to symptoms.
The Tact that this group did not show more physical symptoms than other groups, as
assessed on the medical checklist, supports the latter conclusion.
This group also showed lower discrepancy scores in the recovery period, the
consequence of declines in blood pressure without corresponding declines in self-
reported anxiety. This is evidence of the low correlation between self-report and
physiological measures. It may also redect a conservative tendency to over-estimate
anxiety relative to physical arousal, consistent with the hypothesized higher level of
self-assessment concerning health issues mentioned above.
High rational/high experiential individuals, on the other hand, arc characterized
by having a secure and not a fearful attachment style, by engaging in neither rational
experiential derogation, by not worrying, and by having relatively high scores on a
measure of self-deception. This last fmding casts the others in doubt. Perhaps their low
levels of anxiety, their secure relationships, their lack of worrying, are all self-
presentational. These subjects' high scores on measures of both rationality and
experientiality may also be self-presentational.
The two high-rational groups differ in their self-reported level of cxpcriciitialily
The assumptions made about this variable colored the study's hypotheses. This study
hypothesized that experientiality would moderate rationality in the direction of positive
nor
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psychological health, evidenced by lower scores on a measure of illusory mental health.
Given the results, demonstrating the opposite of the hypothesis of lower illusory mental
health for the high rational/high experiential group, it is possible that a moderating
tendency exists, but in the direction of illusory mental health.
Questions Regardi ng Assumptions;
Both the independent and dependent variables used in this study may admit
reinterpretation.
In considering possible moderating effects on rationality, experientiality may not
be the operative variable. The measure of experientiality used in the pre-screening for
this study is based on an operationalization of experiential processing as intuition.
However, this does not fully capture the nature of experiential processing according to
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory. In addition, it is possible that individuals high in
experientiality do not think of themselves as especially intuitive. The intuitive ability,
perhaps unlike rationality, need not be connected to any objective awareness of such
ability, let alone to its incorporation into the self-image. It may not be directly
assessable using self-report, and individuals reporting high levels of experientiality may
not be representative of all highly experiential individuals.
One assumption made in the design of the study was that extreme scores
represented a greater degree of the attribute, rather than a qualitative difference from
less extreme scores. Subjects were chosen from a pool of individuals with extreme
scores on measures of rational and experiential processing. Their high standing on both
rationality and experientiality may also mean that these individuals are extreme in other
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ways. Describing oneself as highly rational requires a certain level of self-esteem. To
the degree that claiming intuitive ability likewise demonstrates a positive self-image,
individuals in the high rational/high experiential group may possess a level of self-
esteem unrepresentative of the general population.
The dependent measure of illusory mental health was based on physiological
reactivity. It was assumed that high reactivity is a response to stress. Higher
physiological reactivity may in fact represent an adaptive response to stressful
situations. The issue of maladaptive responses may better be addressed by examining
recovery patterns: an adaptive response may consist in high reactivity followed by rapid
recovery. An attempt to do this was made, by including the final relaxation period, with
guided relaxation imagery. However, as the physiological data make evident, either this
manipulation did not work, and possibly backfired, or such relaxation does not affect
the physiological measures used.
The dependent variable of illusory mental health may also be misunderstood. An
assumption made by this study was that low self-reported anxiety in the presence of
high physiological reactivity is evidence of ill health, either mental or physical, and is
maladaptive. However,there may not be serious negative consequences to illusory
mental health. Illusory mental health may represent denial, or it may represent bias
towards positive interpretations.
The relationship between illusory mental health and self-deception demonstrated
by regression analyses argues against the adaptive interpretation. Illusory mental health
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is adaptive only to the degree that self-deception is adaptive. This also can be debated,
but such debate cannot be addressed in this discussion.
On the other hand, if illusory mental health and self-deception entail
physiological or psychological costs to the individual, decrements in performance
should be obtained. The absence of latency effects for the group high in illusory mental
health, high rational/high experiential individuals, argues against that understanding of
self-deception.
Conclusions
This study provides evidence that individuals who are high in both rationality
and experientiality are also characterized by illusory mental health. Are these attributes
manifestations of an underlying variable, such as high self-esteem? or are they causally
related to each other? What function does the illusion of mental health serve? Is it an
element of social desirability?
We can speculate that illusory mental health may involve issues of perceived
control. Rationality may represent a form of control over one's experiences, creating
order in the individual's world. It is also possible that experientiality may involve an
intensity of perceptions and reactions to stimuli, necessitating a relatively high degree of
control in order that the individual may experience some sense of security.Evidence of
higher levels of positive functioning exhibited by the high rational/high experiential
group may be due to differences in subjective well-being, depressive realism, or
unrealistic optimism.
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Are those who show signs of illusory mental health aware of the illusion?
Weinberger (1990) examined repressors, individuals with low levels of self-reported
anxiety but relatively high scores on measures of social desirability. He found that they
sought to limit their own awareness of their negative affect, and not merely other
people's. Davis and Schwartz (1987) found that repressors had limited retention of both
negative and positive affective memories, relative to high-anxious and non-defensive
low-anxious individuals. If self-deception is effective in reducing perceived stress and
enhancing perceived control of one's environment, need it have negative consequences?
Awareness of one's illusions, and the consequences of those illusions, is
intimately connected to the study of thinking styles and processing modes. The goals of
the individual must be associated with the means whereby those goals are reached and
with the individual's self-image. The degree of integration of experientiality and
rationality must have consequences both for self-image and life goals.
Thus, the moderating effect of experientiality on rationality is of interest not
only in determining whether rationality is a positive trait in itself. The issue of the
nature of rationality, and the development ofhuman functioning, is also a question of
the relative strengths of human abilities. The question of the best use of those abilities is
central to the definition of the individual. Adult developmental patterns may well
involve the interaction and integration of the two thinking styles (Labouvie-Vief, 1990).
Wisdom may be the ability to use both the strengths of the rational system, and the
strengths or weaknesses of the experiential system, to arrive at answers to questions in a
real, irrational, world.
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Table 1
Means for Trait Anxiety Discrepancy Measures and Component Physiological and Self-
report Measures
lowR/
low E
highRy
low E
low R/
high E
lllgll ISJ
high E
N 14 17 20 25
Systolic blood pressure 0.05, -0.31, 0.04, 0.15,
Diastolic blood pressure 0.17,
-0.37,
-0.08, 0.22,
Heart rate
-0.09,
-0.10,
-0.07, 0.18,
Trait anxiety score 0.02,, -0.03,, 0.40, -0.31,
Systolic minus trait anxiety 0.03, -0.28,
-0.36, 0.46,
Diastolic minus trait anxiety 0.15,, -0.34,, -0.48, 0.53,
Heart rate minus trait anxiety -0.1 lab -0.07,, -0.47, 0.49,
Note. All component variables standardized. "R": rationality; "E": experientiality;
"Systolic": systolic blood pressure; "Diastolic": diastolic blood pressure;
"Trait anxiety score": Taylor Manifest Anxiety score.
Means not sharing the same subscript differ significantly, p <.05.
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Table 2
Means for Averaged State Anxiety Discrepancy Measures and Component
Physiological and Self-report Measures
low Ky
low E
high R/
low E
low R/
high E
highR/
high E
N 14 17 20 25
Systolic blood pressure 0.05,
-0.31, 0.04, 0.15,
Diastolic blood pressure 0.17,
-0.37,
-0.08, 0.22,
Heart rate
-0.09,
-0.10,
-0.07, 0.18,
Averaged state anxiety score 0.7\ -0.18,
-0.01,
-0.29,
Systolic minus state anxiety
-0.69,
-0.14,, 0.06,, 0.44,
Diastolic minus state anxiety
-0.58,
-0.19,, -0.07,, 0.50,
Heart rate minus state anxiety
-0.83, 0.07,, -0.06,, 0.46,
Note
.
All component variables standardized. "R": rationality; "E": experientiality;
"Systolic": systolic blood pressure; "Diastolic": diastolic blood pressure;
"State anxiety score": averaged repeated-measures composite mood-adjective anxiety
score.
Means not sharing the same subscript differ significantly, p <.05.
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Table 3
Means for Selected Discrepancy Measures and Component Physiological and Self-
report Measures, for Men
low RJ
low E
high RJ
low E
low R/
high E high E
XTIN 8 10 11 13
Diastolic blood pressure 0.21ab -0.29, -0.03,u 0 65u
Trait anxiety score 0.28, -0.04, 0.30, -0.06
Diastolic minus trait anxiety
-0.07,
-0.25,
-0.33, 0.71,
Diastolic blood pressure 0.21,, -0.29,
-0.03,, 0.65,
Averaged state anxiety score 0.62, -0.49, 0.21,, -0.17,,
Diastolic minus state anxiety
-0.41, 0.19, -0.25, 0.83,
Note
.
All component variables standardized. "R": rationality; "E": experientiality;
"Systolic": systolic blood pressure; "Diastolic": diastolic blood pressure;
"Trait anxiety score": Taylor Manifest Anxiety score;
"State anxiety score": averaged repeated-measures composite mood-adjective anxiety
score.
Means not sharing the same subscript differ significantly, p <.05.
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I'able 4
Means for Selected Discrepancy Measures and Component Physiological and Selt-
rcport Measures, for Women
low KJ
low E
nigh Ry
low E
low R/
highE
high RI
high E
N 6 7 9 12
n 1
1
U. 1 1^ -0.47, -0.14,
-0.25,
Trplit Jinxiptv srorp Ct n 1
-U.Ul,,, 0.52,
-0.58,
Diastolic minus trait anxiety 0.44, -0.46,
-0.66, 0.33,
Heart rate
-0.46, 0.20, 0.44, 0.43,
Averaged state anxiety score 0.90, 0.27,, -0.29, -0.41,
Heart rate minus state anxiety
-1.37,
-0.07,, 0.73, 0.84,
Note
.
All component variables standardized. "R": rationality; "E": experientiality;
"Systolic": systolic blood pressure; "Diastolic": diastolic blood pressure;
"Trait anxiety score": Taylor Manifest Anxiety score;
"State anxiety score": averaged repeated-measures composite mood-adjective anxiety
score.
Means not sharing the same subscript differ significantly, p <.05.
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Table 5
Means for Additional Measures
lowR/
low E
highR/
low E
lowR/
high E
highR/
high E
N 14 17 20 25
Under medical treatment, yes or no 0.00^ 0.24, 0.00, 0.04,
Receiving psychotherapy, yes or no O.O?,, 0.18, 0.05,, 0.00,
Therapy sessions past 3 years 1.21, 1.00, 0.20, 0.28,
How satisfied with physical health 2.29, 2.53,, 2.75,, 3.12,
Self-deception, dichotomous scale 0.48, 0.53,, 0.61,, 0.64,
Experiential derogation 2.01, 1.82, 1.16, 0.87,
Rational derogation 1.96, 0.74, 1.47, 0.78,
Fearful attachment style 5.00, 3.88,, 2.80, 2.58,
Secure attachment style 3.14, 4.35,, 4.55,, 5.58,
Worry scale 2.90, 2.75, 2.37,, 2.03,
Note . "R": rationality; "E": experientiality.
Means not sharing the same subscript differ significantly, p <.05.
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Table 6
Means for Additional Measures by Rationality, Experientiality, and Gender
Men: Women:
low R/ high R/ lowR/ highR/ lowRy high R/ low Ry high R/
lowE lowE highE highE lowE low E high E high E
N 8 10 11 13 6 7 9 12
Visit physician 2.12, 1.60, 1.09, 1.85, 1.00, 1.86, 2.11a 1.33,
Therapy 1.50b 0.50, 0.00, 0.23, 0.83,b 1.71b 0.44, 0.33,
Satisfied 2.12ab 2.90,,, 3.00,be 3.08b, 2.50,b, 2.00, 2.44,b, 3.17,
Symptoms 12.88, 11.50, 11.36, 13.77, 8.83, 17.43, 15.78, 11.83,
Note. "R": rationality; "E": experientiality; "Visit physician": visits to physician during
past year; "Therapy": number of sessions during past three years; "Satisfied": how
satisfied they reported being with their physical health; "Symptoms": total physical
symptoms reported.
Means not sharing the same subscript differ significantly, p <.05.
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pre-stress post-stress recovery relaxation
Systolic Diastolic Heart rate
-corrected Physiological Measures: Blood Pressure and Heart Rate
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2a Range-corrected diastolic blood
for men
pressure
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
beflln pro-stroas post-stress recovary relaxation
Milow R/low E
Miloyv R/hIgh E
' M hlgh R/low E
Mihigh R/hIgh E
2b.
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
Range-corrected diastolic blood pressure
for women
bogin prt-8tre«« post-Stress recovery relaxation
Wilow n/low E
W:low n/high e
- I W high R/low E
'
' W:hlgh R/hIgh E
I'igure 2. Rangc-corrcclcd Diastolic Blood Pressure
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3a. Range-corrected composite anxiety score
for men
begin pre-stress post-stress recovery relaxation
M: low R/low E
M: low R/hIgh E
M: high R/low E
M: high R/hIgh E
3b. Range-corrected composite anxiety score
for women
begin pre-stress post-stress recovery relaxation
W: low R/low E
W: low R/high E
W: high R/low E
W: high R/hIgh E
Figure 3. Range-corrected Composite Anxiety Score
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4b. Diastolic blood pressure minus anxiety
for women
0.8 r
Figure 4. Diastolic Blood Pressure Minus Anxiety
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Diastolic blood pressure
minus trait anxiety score
low rationality high rationality
low experientiality ^Shigh experientiality
Figure 5. Diastolic Blood Pressure Minus Trait Anxiety Score
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